Sunday, June 15, 2014

Two-Inch Hose: the Lightweight Preconnected Little Big Line

The concept behind having a preconnected handline is to facilitate quick deployment for a quick attack.

Most pumpers are set up with two types of preconnects: one for what I like to call medium flows of 100 to 185 gallons per minute (gpm) and the other for large flows ranging from 250 to 500 gpm. The high end of the large-flow handline is normally 325 gpm. However, there are a few exceptions. Flows will sometimes reach 500 gpm, but that is more the exception than the rule. The main reason for having a large-flow preconnect is to make a quick large-flow attack on a significant fire to achieve a quick knockdown. This is usually done by the first-in unit. When it comes to large-flow handlines, the 2½-inch hose has always been the weapon of choice, because its lower friction loss capabilities allow for more flow. The drawback to using 2½-inch line is that it is heavy, making it tough to deploy, especially in a quick-attack mode. It is also pretty difficult to move around after it is charged. Because of these negative traits, firefighters will tend to not choose the 2½-inch line. The end result is that firefighters will pull smaller lines, delivering lower than required flows.
This article focuses on the large-flow preconnected handline with a different twist to it: using two-inch hose for the preconnected high-flow handline to make this big-hit line easier to deploy.

Why Two-Inch?

Two-inch hose has been around for several years. The advantages have been for slightly elevated flow and reduced pump discharge pressure (PDP), which reduces engine rpm, reducing wear and tear on the equipment.
The question that comes to mind is whether a two-inch attack line will provide the flows that a 2½-inch line can produce. In the majority of the cases, I would say yes. Take a look at the 2½-inch nozzles in use today. You will find that the majority have flows that top out at 300 to 325 gpm.
The reason for going to two-inch hose is to make hose deployment easier-especially for one firefighter. Whether the staffing on your engine company is four firefighters, three firefighters, or even two firefighters, when a first-in engine company is faced with enough fire to warrant the initial line being a 2½-inch, let's face it-you don't have enough people. This is where the two-inch line comes into play.
The flow tests comparing two-inch and 2 half-inch hoselines used smooth bore nozzles
The flow tests comparing two-inch and 2½-inch hoselines used
smooth bore nozzles. Because the two-inch will have a higher
friction loss at high flows, a nozzle with a low nozzle pressure
keeps the overall discharge pressure as low as possible. (Photos
by author.)

Flow Study

Charts 1 and 2 show 2½-inch and two-inch lines at 200 feet with corresponding flows and PDPs. The two-inch hose is manufactured by Key Fire Hose and is the ECO-10 line. We tested the standard two-inch with 1½-inch couplings weighing 20 pounds per 50-foot section as well as two-inch hose with 2½-inch couplings, which is a new concept. The reason for the 2½-inch couplings is to reduce the friction loss. The tradeoff is two more pounds for the larger couplings (22 pounds total).
The nozzles used for this test are smooth bore tips for a 50-psi nozzle pressure. Because the two-inch will have a higher friction loss at the high flows we tried to achieve, a nozzle with a low nozzle pressure kept the overall discharge pressure as low as possible. The flows for the 2½-inch started at 265 gpm because it is considered a high-flow handline. The flows for the two-inch start at 185 gpm because this line can be used for both low- and high-flow operations-185, 210, 265, 325, and 400 gpm.
Referring to charts 1 and 2, the two-inch hose matched 2½-inch hose in every flow category. The tradeoff for the lighter and easier-to-deploy hose was a higher PDP because two-inch hose has a higher friction loss than 2½-inch hose. Should the higher PDP be a big concern? I say no. First, it's important to understand that the higher pressure used on the hose itself is well within the pressure capabilities for which the two-inch hose is designed. The most common hose pressure ratings for attack line hose include a 1,200-pound-per-square-inch (psi) burst pressure and a 400-psi annual test pressure. According to that National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), this means the hose can be used at up to 360 psi on the fireground. We did not get anywhere close to 360 psi on any of the lines we tested. The stopping point was 220 psi. The average rpm range for the two-inch line was 1,700 to about 1,800 rpm.
The two-inch hose was able to match the 2 half-inch hose in every flow category
The two-inch hose was able to match the 2½-inch hose in every
flow category. The tradeoff for the lighter and easier-to-deploy
hose is that a two-inch hose requires a higher pump discharge
pressure because it has a higher friction loss than 2½-inch hose.
Note the difference in PDP with the two types of two-inch equipped with 1½-inch and 2½-inch couplings. There was a 40-psi reduction in the PDP flowing 325 and 400 gpm by using the 2½-inch couplings. It seems that the real advantage of the 2½-inch couplings kicks in at 325 gpm.
One thing to add about the flow tests is that the nozzle reaction for flows above 250 gpm with the two-inch hose was severe enough to cause the hose to buckle right at the nozzle. Because the two-inch hose is smaller than the 2½-inch line, it does not handle the nozzle reaction as well. The 2½-inch hose did not have a problem with nozzle reaction at all. Keeping that in mind, we decided to use a short piece of 2½-inch five feet long at the end of the two-inch handline for the sole purpose of absorbing nozzle reaction to assist the firefighter with handling the high flows. It worked great.
When using two-inch hose in conjunction with 1½-inch couplings, it's important to remember that the standard for the small handline preconnect plumbing is two inches, which will not be able to support the flows needed for a high-flow handline, at least efficiently. Therefore, it is crucial to connect the two-inch line to a to a 2½-inch discharge-whether it be a standard 2½-inch or one that is designed for a 2½-inch preconnect.
The two-inch hose was able to match the 2 half-inch hose in every flow category
Because the two-inch hose is smaller than the 2½-inch line, it
does not handle nozzle reaction as well. The 2½-inch hose did not
have a problem with nozzle reaction at all. Keeping that in mind,
crews used a short piece of 2½-inch line five feet long at the end
of the two-inch handline for the sole purpose of absorbing nozzle
reaction to handle the high flows.

Strive for Improvement

Striving to do a better job means being able to constantly review and change things as needed. The 2½-inch preconnect has been a great tool for initial attack on a large volume of fire. In reviewing the big line, one area of improvement identified was deploying and delivering the 2½-inch line's big water capability. Two-inch hose is a fix for this problem. As firefighters, we need to always look to improve our work environment. Just because it has worked in the past doesn't mean it can't be done better.

PAUL SHAPIRO is director of Fire Flow Technology. He is a nationally recognized instructor on large-flow water delivery. He is also a retired engineer from the Las Vegas (NV) Fire Department. He has authored numerous articles for fire trade magazines.

Sunday, June 8, 2014

Successful Training Depends on Practice and Trust



BY MARK vonAPPEN
Firefighter survival and Mayday training have saturated the training circuit over the past few years. These important foundational skills have no doubt increased our awareness of the perils of the fireground. In the days following these or other drills, the average firefighter's skill level in these areas is elevated, his awareness is heightened, and the path to skill mastery is in sight. But as weeks and months pass without incident, complacency creeps in, and the path becomes overgrown. Skills and attentiveness are pushed to the farthermost recesses of the mind. In these times of doing more with less (and things are only getting worse), it is imperative that we maintain readiness at the individual and company levels to ensure combat effectiveness.
What happens if we do not practice these skills regularly to maintain a sharp edge? How often does your crew practice the firefighter survival basics or calling the Mayday? We all know we are responding to fewer and fewer fires; this just means we must train more often. On-the-job training through responding to a lot of fire calls simply doesn't happen anymore.
The classroom and the drill ground serve essentially the same purposes: providing explanation, demonstration, correction, and repetition. Skill maintenance involves revisiting critical basics with regularity to ensure the proper response when needed. Thus, we are prepared to function when anxious, confused, or fatigued.

MASTERY DEPENDS ON WORK ETHIC

To almost anyone reading this article, the levels of learning or mastery are academic. Those who regularly teach are well schooled in the levels of learning and the learning domains—cognitive, affective, and psychomotor skills.
Let's review the levels of learning.
Unconscious incompetence is the lowest level of mastery. People aren't good at something, don't even know it, and won't admit it. To improve a member's task performance, he must first admit that he needs experience and practice.
Conscious incompetence is a level at which one is convinced he is an expert at a task when he is not. The instructor must make the student aware of his limitations and educate him on the subject.
Conscious competence is the level at which the person has the ability to do the right thing but has to think about it.
Unconscious competence is the highest level of mastery. As Bruce Lee put it, "Learn it until you forget it."
The scope of our profession has become incredibly vast—30 years of mission creep has left the fire service with a serious identity crisis. As a result, most of us operate in the unconscious incompetence realm.
If we're good, we move to the conscious incompetence region—making us a little safer—because we're smart enough to recognize that we don't know something.
If we're really good, we operate in the conscious competence realm. Those of us who work hard at our craft can perform most skills competently, although we must rifle through our memories to retrieve the correct action.
I would hazard to say that I don't know (you don't, either) anyone who has achieved unconscious competence, a sort of Zen mastery, in our profession. I wish I did; I'd join his crew and try to figure out what his secret is.
I have never gotten good at anything by not doing it. I'm the type of person who has to practice a skill over and over again to get it right. Once I do get it, I still have to practice tirelessly to make sure I stay sharp. It's exhausting. I am extremely envious (and rather skeptical) of anyone who can observe a skill once and believes he has mastered it. I want to know the secret, too.
Our ability to retain information and apply it to the correct situation is directly related to how far we are willing take ourselves on the path to mastery. According to the National Training Laboratories Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, learning retention depends on how learning is imparted and what, if any, learning reinforcement occurs thereafter: lecture, five percent; reading, 10 percent; audiovisual, 20 percent; demonstration, 30 percent; group discussion, 50 percent; physical practice, 75 percent; and teaching others, 90 percent. Most fire department training ceases at the 75-percent level, practice by doing, and progresses no further.
We cannot wander through our career blissfully unaware of the hazards associated with our profession. We must maintain superior skills and study accident reports assiduously to avoid missteps. We must know with certainty our limitations and those of our equipment in any given situation.

DETERMINING SKILL LEVEL

If you want to challenge yourself and your crew, conduct a "flash drill." Assemble personnel on the apparatus floor, in full turnout gear, and in a timed drill have them don their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Once they are sufficiently frustrated with you (because it is either too easy for them or they look like they are trying to fight off a rapacious spider monkey clinging to their back), ask them what their Mayday parameters are, and have them call a Mayday.
We have implemented some of this "flash" training with some of our probationary firefighters. We conducted Mayday training for our folks about two years ago and have subsequently trained about 10 probies in the intervening months. At six months' to a year's time, the training seems to disappear, even after we tell them to practice calling a Mayday every time they check their SCBA.
It's called complacency—the nastiest word in our profession.
Ask 10 probies to call a Mayday a year after the training, and eight out of 10 will have the same reaction.
They roll back their eyes, tilt their heads, and purse their lips in thought. The first words will not be "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday" but rather "Oh, damn!" or "Umm ...."
Mayday and survival training is a form of stress inoculation training (SIT) designed to create emotional responses to stressful situations to achieve a desired response. These emotional bookmarks can become less vivid in our mind's eye if we do not revisit these stressful training situations regularly—as is true with any skill.
Ron Avery is a law enforcement trainer and a world-class competitive pistol shooter. He pushes the envelope in terms of stress-related training through "stress acclimatization." Your prior successes under stressful circumstances acclimatize you to similar situations and promote future success. Quoted in Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman's book, On Combat, he describes the process this way:
With proper training and the requisite conditioning and practice, we can achieve skills thought by others to be impossible. There is a whole realm of possibilities we can teach and train (personnel) to perform. Stress acclimatization is about measuring precise doses of stress followed by waves of recovery and then repeating these cycles very specifically. There must be time for adaptation to take place and there must be enough training, repeated over time, to help it stick.
Without regular practice, skills are dulled and reactions to the stressor become sluggish. The firefighter involved in combat with a tenacious, relentless enemy cannot afford slow reflexes.

INTRODUCING SIT

University of Pennsylvania researchers found mindfulness training, or MT, correlates with managing emotions and maintaining working memory. Mindfulness is a balancing act, the ability to be conscious and alert in the moment—i.e., having situation awareness—while maintaining emotional control.
Demanding training in military Special Forces involves months of food and sleep deprivation. In the months prior to a deployment, service members receive exhaustive training on mission-critical tactical skills, physical training, and SIT to orient them to stressors they may experience during their approaching mission. They also must psychologically prepare to leave loved ones and face potentially violent and unpredictable situations during their deployment. Misery in training has value—after this stressful training, regular life seems easy in comparison.
Constant and rigorous demands like those experienced during high-stress events have been shown to reduce working memory capacity and lead to cognitive failures during fast-moving events. Simply put, when we are scared out of our minds, we lose the ability to think logically. Working memory has a limited capacity and can be easily overwhelmed when subjected to a high amount of stress. Our emotional reaction can overwhelm working memory and will make it difficult to perform simple skills that have not been refined to the point of muscle memory.
Building up a tolerance to stress with SIT may help anyone who must maintain optimum performance during extremely stressful circumstances. A major part of what makes SIT successful is that it elevates the student's confidence and takes some of the surprise out of combat. SIT may have cross-over benefits in that training for stressful situations in one discipline may improve performance under stress in other disciplines.
Preparing firefighters for life-and-death situations is our ultimate responsibility in training. The solution to lapses in memory concerning survival training is repeated stressful, challenging evolutions that include preparation for the possibility of being trapped or injured in a structure fire.

SIT TRAINING PRINCIPLES

In his book On Combat, Grossman describes SIT training principles.
Never "kill" a firefighter in training. Often, training exercises involve trainees being "killed" when they make a move that is inconsistent with the desired training. Teaching students to die sends the wrong message. Instructors should never "pronounce" students on the training ground. We need to teach firefighters to live, not to die. We need to train ourselves to never give up and train our fellow firefighters to be equally tenacious in defense of their lives.
Giving firefighters the experience of losing in a scenario actually begins to condition a risk aversion pathway in the brain. They may actually stop fighting when presented with a similar situation in the real world, just as they were conditioned to perform in training.
Teach students that if they are trapped, they must follow their Mayday procedures and seek safety. If we are taught to stop fighting when confronted with a survival situation, we are programming ourselves to roll over and die when the real situation arises. Giving students the possibility of success in extremely challenging situations inspires "learned resourcefulness" as opposed to "learned helplessness." We must continue to fight. The fire may take our life because sometimes the objective hazard is simply too great, but we must never give it willingly.
Don't let anyone leave the training site a loser. The job of the trainer is to design evolutions that are challenging but not impossible to complete successfully. Designing evolutions that have no possibility for success and are beyond the aptitude of the students, thus making them feel stupid, gives the trainer (in this case, a megalomaniac) a sick form of gratification. Just as we should never "kill" a student in training, we must never "kill" his will to learn.
Standing over a trainee with your arms folded, shaking your head disapprovingly as he struggles to grasp a concept, only proves that the trainer hungers for others to fail so that person can assert his knowledge and authority. In no uncertain terms, this is bullying, which leads to resentment and inhibits the creation of a positive learning environment. If you want to lose your audience immediately, act like a pretentious know-it-all on the drill ground.
Students must be allowed to make mistakes in training. Doers make mistakes. If a trainee fails to perform an evolution correctly on the first attempt, train that person on the desired behavior. Allow him an opportunity to perform the skill correctly. In doing so, you expose a weakness in the trainee's game and then give him the opportunity to correct it, making that trainee a stronger fireground performer.
Never talk trash about your students. A coach is someone who can give correction without causing resentment. Cultivating trust in the training environment is a must if we seek an elite level of performance.
Trust in the instructor and faith in the training mission allow trainees to stretch themselves, to go to places outside their established comfort zones. The result is trainees who seek greater depths of knowledge because they feel comfortable trying new things. If they are free to ask questions, they are better able to maintain a beginner's mind, where possibilities are many, as opposed to someone who thinks himself an expert, closing his mind to different points of view, where the possibilities are few. Trust allows the instructor to take the students to places they wouldn't ordinarily go.
The old axiom applies here, "Praise in public, criticize in private." If the proper training environment is created, people will no longer avoid training. When the word gets out about all of the positive experiences people have had during training you have sponsored, people will want to be a part of it.
Report successful operations to everyone—celebrate success. Celebrating success is a key element in the survival mindset. Report failures up the chain of command to ensure that proper follow-up training is administered.
Creating an environment that inspires thought, involves everyone, and makes them want to train is paramount to maintaining good faith in training. Do not "kill" students. Do not allow failure and bullying to take over your training ground.

BAD DAYS VS. BAD HABITS

It is acceptable to have a bad day, but it is unacceptable for bad days to become habit. It is unacceptable not to train and exercise all resources at your disposal to improve performance and ensure that a bad habit does not show itself at the moment of truth.
We must develop good habits and continually put them into practice on each response. Initiate every response from an aggressive standpoint. The word "aggressive" may disturb some people, but it's not about the current safety-vs.-attack culture clash. It's about aggressively employing tactics and strategy on every response—wearing appropriate personal protective equipment; using the correct incident command system or fire command terminology; and, if you really want to step up your game, performing a tool drop that is appropriate for the structure. We must aggressively assert our knowledge, skills, and abilities at every opportunity. It makes good sense.
Accomplishing these skills repeatedly reinforces the correct behavior when the bullets are flying for real. We become the things we do. Your crew members will not rise to the level of combat. They will sink to the level of their training.
Elite performers are not immune from bad days. They are creatures of habit; they rise to an elite level with God-given talent but also through hard work and a dogged determination toward a goal. They become what they repeatedly do.
Think of your favorite professional athlete. I'm sure you can recall a time when he looked as though the other players were two steps ahead of him. What separates elite performers from the rest of us is their ability to recognize their shortcomings, recover quickly, and adapt to what their opponent throws at them. They emerge from their bad day better and stronger.

PAY ATTENTION

The drive for excitement and the accompanying emotional payoff may lead us at times to exceed an acceptable level of threat and assume undue risk. When we are rewarded with a rush of emotions after successfully completing a dangerous fireground task, we bookmark the experience as positive. We continually seek the emotional reward brought on by previous successes—while increasing risk taking—and might miss important cues about the constantly changing environment.
Organizations cannot train for unimagined, highly dangerous, never-before-seen situations. If we continually study accident reports, learn from them, and participate repeatedly in stressful, scenario-based training, we are less likely to be surprised. Also quoted in On Combat, Brigadier General Chuck Yeager, the first pilot to break the sound barrier, said the following regarding preparation:
I was always afraid of dying. Always. It was my fear that made me learn everything about my equipment, and kept me respectful of my machine and always alert.
Recognizing fireground accident triggers is key. Removing a link from the error sequence can prevent tragedy. We must know these fireground triggers—accidents are often the culmination of many common events that align in unexpected ways leading to hostile events. It means we must pay attention—all the time. The fireground will punish inattention absolutely. We are not often afforded a second chance when dealing with Mother Nature; she likes to strip the unwary of their arrogance. The fireground will not adapt to us; we must adapt to it.
The attitude that the fireground is something contrived, almost too familiar, is an extremely dangerous one. To help bad days from developing into bad habits, keep these common accident factors in mind.
Common human factors that contribute to accidents include the following:
  • Inadequate or impaired communications.
  • Unclear direction from incident command.
  • Repeatedly attempting to achieve unattainable goals.
  • Failure to recognize rapid fire growth potential.
Interior operations warning signs. Keep an eye out for the following fireground situations, and be prepared to take the appropriate measures:
  • Active working fire, delayed entry, or loss of "time recognition" by crews or the incident commander (IC).
  • Multiple companies assigned to enter through one entry point.
  • Roof division companies retreating from the roof as crews are preparing to go inside.
  • Air is rapidly drawn in zero visibility and heat is banking down.
  • Interior crews can hear but not see the fire burning above them.
  • Interior crews are working under a mezzanine.
  • Crews feel "uncomfortable" with the situation they are in.
  • A crew member's SCBA low-air alarm activates and the crew continues searching for the seat of the fire.
  • Interior crews flow water for several minutes but make no progress on the fire.
  • Interior crews hear the sound of roof ventilation operations conducted behind them.
  • Crews are unable to communicate with the IC or division/group supervisors.
  • A crew or crew member is in trouble and fails to recognize it.
  • An "Emergency Traffic" call is delayed or not initiated.
  • Crews are deep inside a commercial building with 1¾-inch lines instead of 2½-inch lines.
  • Prior to building entry, fireground companies and the IC fail to recognize basic construction features that should influence decisions and actions.
  • Crews and ICs do not follow the "order model" for communications, or they use unclear terms and send mixed messages.
  • Company officers are not monitoring the air supply status of their crews and are not practicing proper air-management techniques.
  • All members operating on the fireground fail to evaluate and apply the risk management philosophy to their assignment.
As stated earlier, without continued practice and visualization, training can disappear from our memory center. We must take classroom concepts and practice them religiously so that they become muscle memory.

CALLING THE MAYDAY

Serious study of entrapment situations, rehearsing your response, calling the Mayday, emergency SCBA profile maneuvers, and knowing where important tools are located in your pockets prior to the emergency will aid in keeping you prepared for survival events.
Situations that warrant an immediate Mayday transmission include, but are not limited to, the following: falling through a floor or the roof, separation from a partner or crew, low-air alarm activation, entanglement in wires, or entrapment from a collapse or the fire.
Use the FACT acronym to identify a Mayday situation.
  • Fall: through a floor, a roof, a ceiling, or something falls on you.
  • Air: experience an SCBA malfunction or other air emergency.
  • Caught: entangled or otherwise stuck.
  • Trapped: by fire, collapse, or disorientation.
    Use the NUCAN acronym to report a Mayday.
  • Name: Identify yourself.
  • Unit: Provide unit designator and location.
  • Conditions: Describe your situation/condition and fire conditions or entrapment level.
  • Actions/Air: Explain actions taken and air remaining.
  • Needs: Identify what you need for your rescue.

    ONE-MINUTE MAYDAY DRILLS

    Individuals and crews can practice calling the Mayday using the following scenarios.
    Scenario 1. You are assigned to Engine 1, fire attack. You and your partner enter a single-family dwelling using the A side door. The floor collapses, sending you into the basement. You cannot locate your partner, and you are pinned under debris. Three-quarters of your air remains.
    Scenario 2. You and your partner from Engine 2 are backing up fire attack on the primary hoseline when you lose voice contact with your partner and lose contact with the hoseline. You are in a large commercial building, approximately 200 feet inside. You attempt to find the hoseline several times without success, and your low-air alarm has activated.
    Scenario 3. You are assigned to Truck 1, primary search. You and a partner enter a two-story single-family dwelling by an A side door, ascend the stairs, and begin primary search operations on the second floor. During the search, the ceiling collapses, dropping wires on your partner, entangling him. You attempt to free your partner but succeed only in entangling him further. Fire and heat conditions are getting worse. You are both running low on air; neither of you has wire cutters in your turnouts. You both have just above one-quarter of your air remaining.
    Scenario 4. You are assigned to Engine 3 and are performing a search with a partner in a single-family dwelling when the roof collapses on you and your partner. You entered on the B side of the house through an exterior window. You are uninjured and mobile, but your partner is unconscious and pinned. You are cut off from your primary exit, and the fire is advancing on you. You have half of your air remaining.
    Have personnel read each scenario, one at a time, to give them an idea of their situation. For each scenario, they must use the FACT acronym to confirm they are in a Mayday situation and must call the Mayday using the NUCAN acronym steps. Additionally, participants must state the actions they would take—turn on personal alert safety system (PASS), turn on a light, turn up radio volume, and so forth. Also, they would provide any additional follow-up information (i.e., sights, sounds, floor coverings).

    MAYDAY MESSAGE

    Firefighter: "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!"
    IC: "Firefighter calling Mayday: Give me your NUCAN report."
    Firefighter: "IC, Firefighter Jones. Engine 3, searching first-floor, Bravo side.
    There was a collapse; I fell into the basement. I am alone, pinned, and cannot move.
    I am turning on my PASS and light. I have half a tank.
    I need immediate assistance."
    To increase difficulty, have the firefighter in the distress scenario don his SCBA mask and try to communicate on a portable radio. Place the lost firefighter in a location remote from the rescuer. The rescuer should attempt to obtain a NUCAN report from the down firefighter and take notes while doing so. Once the transmission is complete, the participants should get together to compare notes. The rescuer will thus see if he correctly understood the lost firefighter. If using radios in this training, be sure to use a nonmonitored tactical channel.
    •••
    Successfully navigating the perils of a career in firefighting requires complete buy-in of discipline, training commitment, and the safety mission. It involves total awareness—or meta-knowledge—a synthesis of knowledge accumulated over a career, training the right way, perceptions, processing risk, and discoveries of the ever-evolving environment. Only through this type of hyperawareness can we be better fireground combatants.

    References

    Grossman, Dave. On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace. Warrior Science Group Inc., 2007.
    National Training Laboratories Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, "The Learning Triangle: Retention Rates from Different Ways of Learning," Bethel, Maine, 2005.
    MARK vonAPPEN, a member of the Palo Alto (CA) Fire Department since 1998, is assigned to the Suppression Division, where he is a captain. He is a committee member for California State Fire Training and has contributed to the development of firefighter survival and rapid intervention curriculums. He is an instructor for the Santa Clara County Joint Fire Academy, a recruit instructor for Palo Alto Fire, and a member of the "Nobody Gets Left Behind" training group. vonAppen writes the blog "Fully Involved" for fireengineering.com.
  • Two in/Two out versus Rapid Intervention: Is there a difference?

    Last quarter, I wrote of the changes we’ve seen in both fires and buildings over the last quarter century. Many of today’s buildings are constructed of lightweight materials and energy efficiency designs. Fuels today are less commonly natural products and more commonly synthetics. Consider that pound for pound, hydrocarbons — such as polyethylene and polyurethane — will produce twice as much heat as ordinary combustibles and consume 50 percent more oxygen. For comparison purposes, a pound of cotton produces approximately 6,894 BTUs, a pound of gasoline produces approximately 19,100 BTUs, and a pound of polyethylene produces 20,100 BTUs.

    What does all this mean? It means that we have fires burning hotter than gasoline and consuming oxygen more quickly under construction that is designed to hold heat — reducing the time to flashover — and that fails (falls down) more quickly. To be sure, fire fighting today is nothing like it has ever been. The changes in fuel packages and construction have created an extremely dangerous environment that we are called upon to enter routinely. Battling modern structure fires requires enhanced personal protective equipment, command and coordination, and a group of trained firefighters dedicated to rescuing the firefighters inside should they become disoriented, lost, trapped or incapacitated.

    The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) number 29 part 1910 subpart g number 4, provides that at least two “employees” enter the fire (“Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health IDLH} Atmosphere”) and remain in visual or voice contact with one another at all times. These employees must also utilize self-contained breathing apparatus. Additionally, at least two “employees” must be located outside the IDLH atmosphere and one of those individuals may be assigned an additional role such as incident commander or safety officer, as long as the individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at the incident.
    It is important to note that the CFR refers to “employees” but this term includes volunteers. This is the infamous two in/two out regulation, which quickly became “two in/one out” after its original publication. So, according to the CFR which, is enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), we can have two people inside while having only one person dedicated to rescuing the firefighters inside and another that can serve as the Incident Commander but must be available to assist in rescuing the firefighters inside.

    This was the federal government’s best response to us routinely not having backup firefighters in place. Prior to “two in/two out,” in urban departments, this was frequently referred to as “don’t run out of stuff, make sure you’ve got an extra company or two.” In rural areas, having extra people was an infrequently encountered luxury. But imagine that you are on the scene of a structure fire with five people and you are serving as the Incident Commander and part of the “two out.” The other member of our two out is trained at the same level as the firefighters inside, but has no rescuing the rescuer/rapid intervention training. The fire is not visible yet but there is brown to black turbulent smoke issuing from every crack and crevice of the building. You have two firefighters inside when suddenly a flashover occurs associated with a simultaneous “Mayday” issued by one of the interior firefighters.

    The law says that you should join the other member of your “two out” and initiate a rescue of the firefighters inside. This forces your fifth person at the scene — possibly the pump operator who has not done a 360 degree walk around of the building — to assume command. At the point you enter the building to affect a rescue of the interior firefighters, you are at the greatest tactical disadvantage that exists in the fire service. You are now operating with four personnel inside and one person outside. While the arrival of other personnel may be imminent, they will be forced to report to the fifth person outside — possibly the pump operator who still has not done a 360 degree walk around of the building because they have been busy trying to establish water supply — continue fire control efforts, and hopefully screaming for more help on the radio. This is two in/two out and it varies somewhat from rapid intervention.

    I submit that rapid intervention is on a different plane than “two out.” A firefighter that is trained in rapid intervention is much different than one who lacks the training. If you ask any firefighter what they learned in rapid intervention, they will tell you that they learned a lot of techniques to avoid becoming trapped, lost or incapacitated. They also learned how to maneuver through walls, how to perform a coordinated search, and how to extricate victims using a number of techniques. Above all, they will likely tell you that they learned that rapid intervention is not very rapid. In fact, in many cases, it requires a large number of firefighters and a tremendous amount of time. 

    Consider firefighter Brett Tarver from Phoenix, AZ. He became disoriented and lost at the Southwest Supermarket Fire on March 14, 2001 in downtown Phoenix. The fire began as a dumpster fire and spread into the supermarket. Initial entry revealed only light smoke inside but fire progression rapidly led to Tarver being separated from his crew in the back of the store. Tarver issued a mayday and the rapid intervention crew was deployed within the same minute. They found Tarver a mere nine minutes later but it took 43 minutes to extricate him from the building using multiple rapid intervention crews and sadly firefighter Tarver succumbed to his injuries.

    I once participated in a rapid intervention drill as part of the third-in rapid intervention team. The first and second teams had gained access to the room where the simulated victim was by cutting wires, breaching walls and navigating several confined spaces. However, they were unable to locate the victim. Our team was able to reach the victim but our air supply forced us to turn back immediately after securing an alternative air supply on the victim. Let that sink in a second. 

    We were the third group of four people that entered the building and all we did was secure a mask from a RIT air pack and tell the simulated victim that the next rapid intervention team would begin the extrication process. Twelve people spent and the victim has not even begun to move to the outside yet. The simulated victim was eventually removed from the building by rapid intervention team number five — that is persons 17, 18, 19, and 20. If we put this scenario at our fire that has five firefighters at it, you can easily see how unmatched we are against the fire and the building.

    Rapid intervention is not just two out. It requires a level of training that is much higher than basic interior fire fighting. Rapid intervention training also provides an environment where firefighters are taxed physically and emotionally to, and frequently past, their limits. This teaches the firefighters to control their actions and thinking when they are physically and mentally exhausted, as well as how to continue to operate when their bodies think that they cannot. This is not something that you gain experience in by spending 10 minutes in a burn building during a fire attack evaluation at the end of a basic fire fighting course.

    Coordination and communication is paramount whenever a mayday occurs. The only reason we were able to reach the simulated victim during the scenario I previously described was because everyone was working on the same page. If everyone were working from a different entrance to try to reach the victim, it would have taken a much larger number of personnel — as if 20 weren’t enough.

    Rapid intervention is not just someone sitting outside hoping that nothing bad happens inside. Instead, rapid intervention teams/crews should be constantly evaluating the building — for both ingress/egress and likely layout — compiling appropriate equipment to affect a rescue, and maintaining vigilance while understanding that they will likely require additional support from supplemental personnel. Removing the Incident Commander when a firefighter becomes lost, disoriented, trapped or incapacitated is not at all ideal. In fact, the contrary is true. The original IC will likely need to coordinate the rapid intervention activities while another officer will need to assume command of the entire incident and coordinate incoming resources. 

    Finally, consider your resources. In many departments, a mayday automatically triggers the next sequential alarm. You should recognize now that an incident requiring rapid intervention will likely not be rapid and will require an enormous amount of personnel and equipment.

    There was a lot of fire service resistance to the issuance of the two in/two out regulation. Perhaps this was but the first step in where we need to go. What we need today are firefighters who understand the changes in fires and buildings that are occurring. We need firefighters who are trained beyond basic interior suppression and understand the complexities of rescuing one of their own. Beyond that, we need to recognize that two firefighters inside with two firefighters outside — one of which that is serving as the Incident Commander — is setting ourselves up for what could potentially be a disastrous failure.

    Be safe and do good.
    David Greene has over 20 years experience in the fire service and is currently the Assistant Chief with Colleton County (SC) Fire-Rescue. He is currently working on his PhD through Oklahoma State University. He is a certified Executive Fire Officer through the National Fire Academy, holds the Chief Fire Officer Designation and is an adjunct instructor for the South Carolina Fire Academy. He can be reached at dagreene@lowcountry.com .

    Baby proofed houses pose risk to firefighters

     written by: Daren Vaughn (via Carolina Fire Rescue Journal)

    “Baby proofed” is a term I am use to around my house. This is mainly due to my two year old running around and if it can be broken, destroyed, colored on, painted and opened it has happened or is going to happen. That is the sole reason for my house being “baby proofed.” For those of us who have kids I know this is a term that we laugh at, because we know that it is not possible to baby proof anything. But for us in the fire service this is something that we need to become familiar with, quick!


    Here is an example. You are dispatched to a residential structure fire and on arrival you have heavy smoke showing from the “A” side of the structure. As on most fires, we go in to conduct a search. You and your team go in and conduct a right hand search. As you get deeper into the search, conditions began to deteriorate. It is becoming hotter and visibility is now at zero. Command comes over the radio asking for your progress. You report back the current conditions and keep moving. You know from your experience that you probably are running out of time inside the structure. That’s when you hear a collapse and then command in combination with three-load blast from the air horn, tell you to evacuate the structure. You are aware that the collapse happened behind you so it is now time to find your secondary means of egress. Command is on the radio, the air horns are blowing, it’s hot and you can’t see. You are moving as fast as possible with your team. You find a door; grab the doorknob and turn, nothing. Turn the knob again, nothing. What is going on? You keep trying and trying and nothing is happening. Frustration is building, heart is pounding, it’s getting hotter and you can’t get out.

    You have just made contact with a “baby proofed” doorknob. This is placed on the interior doorknob of an exterior door in order to keep those little hands from turning a doorknob and walking out of the house. I have also seen these on interior doorknobs to keep kids out of rooms that parents do not want kids in. The “baby proofed” doorknob is a two-piece hardened plastic covering that fits over an interior doorknob. It has two finger holes on opposite sides and a whole in the front for the locking mechanism.

    During a recent training night at the fire department, without telling our guys what they were about to encounter, we conducted a two-man search drill. The drill consisted of a search of two rooms, a simulated collapse, a little stress — pushups, yelling, clapping — an explanation of the conditions — high heat and zero visibility simulated with a dark room and flash hood turned around — and then the evacuation tone. The exit door was equipped with a “baby proof” doorknob.

    What we learned. For the firefighters that have kids for the most part had no problem with getting out. Some would spin and spin the doorknob until frustration mounted and then would grab the back of the plastic and rip it off. Others would grab it perfectly by chance and it would open immediately. This was all done with a gloved hand, which limits your ability to recognize what you are feeling. Also take into account the locking mechanism. We tried numerous ways and were unsuccessful with unlocking the lock with a gloved hand. One other factor that we have to take into account is the construction of the door. Some interior doors are hollow and with any tool you should be able to eliminate the door as a problem and not worry about the doorknob itself. However if the door is made of solid wood and/or a steel exterior door what other options do you now have? Will the tool you have in your hand get you out if the doorknob is equipped with a baby proofed doorknob? Take into account that most doors that lead to the exterior open inward. If both the dead bolt and door knob are equipped with baby proofed items on a solid wood or steel door what are your options now? Do you practice “forcible exit” techniques in zero visibility conditions under stress?

    What we also observed is the fact that once the firefighters made contact with the door and doorknob they instantly checked the door first by pushing on it. Once they located the doorknob they either had success instantly or once the stress of the situation kept mounting, due to evacuation tones going off and the adrenaline kicked in, they were able to get out. The only thing is that this was a training night and a controlled environment. In the fight we understand that seconds matter and seconds is what it takes to mitigate the door knob.

    Through further research we have learned that you have various types of baby proofing for the door. You have metal sliding brackets at the top of the door, dead bolt covers, and other doorknob covers that take two different pressure locations to open the door. You also have to take into account baby gates. Where are these gates located: bedrooms, bottom of stairs, top of stairs, and open doors? How do they open? Are they permanently attached to the wall or will they break away from the wall? If it does break away is it now attached to you and your gear? Is this now an entanglement hazard?

    Now we are going to return to your arrival on the fire scene. As you pull up you see toys in the front yard. In my line of work we call this a clue! Now that you have read this you should automatically think that this house could be baby proofed. If you do not train on this, however, it does not matter what you see in the front yard.

    Daren Vaughn began with the fire service in 1996 as an 11-year-old with the Rock Springs Volunteer Fire Department in Anderson County, S.C. He has served in numerous roles since and currently holds the rank of captain of training. He is a volunteer with the City of Belton Fire Department. He is employed as an Arson/Bomb investigator for the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division.

    Friday, June 6, 2014

    Officer Development


    The Professional Volunteer Fire Department, Part 6: Officer Development




    By Thomas A. Merrill
    When a volunteer firefighter is elected or appointed to the position of fire officer, it is the department’s duty and obligation to provide some type of officer and leadership development training. Departments should not expect new officers to immediately possess all the technical, leadership, and management skills expected from a competent fire service leader. However, as important as it is for volunteer departments to invest in officer development, it is equally  important for officers to embrace their new role and responsibilities. Officers should take advantage of any opportunities that can make them a more educated and well-rounded fire officer and leader.

    Many paid departments spend weeks on officer training and offer specialized classes for each officer rank. Although it is easier for paid departments to offer this type of training because they can schedule classes during regular work hours, volunteer firefighters face time constraints because of their paying jobs, family commitments, and other obligations. These constraints make it difficult for volunteers to attend formal training programs, especially if the program stretches out over a period of several weeks or longer. The difficulty in scheduling formal leadership  training for volunteer departments emphasizes the importance for volunteers to take advantage of other opportunities that will improve their leadership and technical capabilities.

    All fire officers should read and understand their department’s standard operating procedures (SOPs). Once they are familiar with the SOPs, they can immediately reinforce them by regularly attending the department’s training drills. In addition to reinforcing the SOPs, training drills allow volunteers to sharpen their skills and become proficient in operating a wide variety of equipment in the arsenal. It is just as important for officers to train as it is for those serving under them. Firefighting, emergency medical services (EMS), and technical skills are  parts of officer training that can always be improved on.

    In addition to technical training drills, officers should also go through formal leadership and management training. Classes, seminars, and workshops often focus on this type of education. Many areas of the country have fire service organizations that occasionally host leadership programs such as these, and volunteer fire officers should try to attend them.

    Since the very nature of the volunteer fire service makes it very difficult for  officers to attend extra training programs, they should find other sources to substitute for whatever formalized training they do not receive. There are countless venues available for volunteer fire officers to take advantage of on their own time schedule. The Internet is a flexible tool that offers Web casts, podcasts, and a variety of other helpful forums for new or aspiring officers to gain valuable lessons at their own convenience. In addition, trade publications feature leadership columns, and many great books are available on fire service command and leadership. A successful volunteer fire officer will seek out this material and spend time reviewing it. John Salka was correct when he said, “If you are going to be a leader, you have to be a reader.”

    Many times, I have observed in volunteer departments that new officers are young and have limited experience. If they have yet to marry or start a career, they may have spare time to dedicate to the department. This time can be used to perform many of the routine tasks expected of an officer such as truck checks, tool inventory, and so on. Some departments like the idea of appointing young officers because of their availability. This is not a criticism; I started out this way when I was elected a lieutenant in my hometown department three decades ago. Young officers are dedicated and enthusiastic, and their useful enthusiasm is to be commended. It is important, however, that officers understand the responsibilities their new role entails so they work hard to develop into a competent and confident leader.

    Sometimes new officers focus solely on the technical side of the job, such as its required tactics, strategies, and EMS skills. This may cause them to neglect their leadership and management responsibilities. An advantage young officers have is the ability to take leadership and management classes while attending school. I tell my young firefighters who are attending college to work some of these classes into their schedule, if possible. Even if young firefighters do not advance into the officer ranks, or if their paid careers take them far from the fire service, the lessons learned will be useful throughout their lives and serve them well in any vocations they embark on.   

    The concept of learning from others is often overlooked by young firefighters. We have all been inspired by experienced leaders and officers who had a positive influence on us and possessed fantastic leadership qualities. Try to emulate the style and behavior of these successful officers. Conversely, you can learn from a poorly performing officer or an officer who demoralizes the rank and file. Take note of what does and does not work. This task doesn’t cost volunteers much time; it simply is a matter of observing traits, styles, and behaviors throughout their careers.

    Mistakes will be made; fire officers should never be afraid to critique themselves and learn from their mistakes. Reviewing incidents, decisions, and events in which the officer played a role is part of the leadership development process. Also, engage in discussions with other officers and seek out retired and senior firefighters within your department who are respected and acknowledged as genuine leaders. Valuable lessons and information can be gained from these experienced members.
    Not only do volunteer fire officers choose to join their department, but they volunteer to accept the title of fire officer as well. This title brings immense responsibilities. The department has a responsibility to provide the leadership training necessary to make their officers successful. Similarly, officers have a personal responsibility to embrace their new role and take advantage of opportunities that will help them develop into a well-rounded fire service leader.

    Fire Dept. and Social Media


    The Professional Volunteer Fire Department, Part 14–Social Media

     
     
    By Thomas A. Merrill
    What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. And on Facebook. And Twitter. And anywhere else people decided to post their photos and comments for the world to see. Of course, what people post is their own personal business. However, the professional volunteer firefighter has a duty and obligation to ensure his posts do not negatively impact the image and reputation of his department or our great fire service. 

    Used correctly, social media can be a great tool and can contribute greatly to a department’s professional reputation. But, if used inappropriately, a firefighter and a department’s reputation can be destroyed very quickly, and that damage can be hard to repair.  

    The professional volunteer fire department should develop and implement a stringent social media policy outlining what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. It should also identify who is authorized to make postings on behalf of the department. Department leaders should also seek legal guidelines regarding what can be posted. In addition, all firefighters, from the newest probie to the most senior member, need to be educated and made aware of the immediate impact (good and bad) social media postings can have on a firefighter and a fire department. They need to understand that as firefighters, they are held to a higher standard of conduct and whatever they choose to post, they are posting as a firefighter and as a member of their department. 

    Firefighters should even be careful and use discretion when creating a post as a private citizen on their own personal social media accounts. Chances are, they have something on their site identifying themselves as a firefighter. Images such as a proud pose in that full dress uniform, an action shot at a fire call, or comments about a recent department function all certainly clearly identify them. It simply might just be the fact that people and acquaintances know they are firefighters. Our members need to understand this and, as firefighters, they should act accordingly and uphold the stalwart and honorable reputation we enjoy.  

    Remember, once something is posted, it is out there forever, and it is hard to retract. The speed at which the information spreads across cyberland is impressive. I recently experienced firsthand the immediate impact social media can have. I have four daughters, and they strive to help me understand the latest and greatest smartphone apps and methods for posting and sharing information.

    One day, I accidentally broke a glass in my kitchen. I have a little bit of a temper, and I was pretty upset with myself. As I proceeded to clean up the mess, I was letting everybody within ear shot know how mad I was. Well, a minute or two later, I received a phone call from my sister asking if I needed any help. How in the world, I wondered, did my sister know what was going on? I soon found out: my 15-year-old daughter had secretly recorded me and quickly posted it for the world to see. That’s how quick information—good or bad, happy or sad, right or wrong—spreads today, and we need to be aware of it.

    Great firefighting careers have been ruined by poor decisions when it comes to social media, and the poor decisions have led to the demotion and firing of more than one firefighter over the past few years. Although volunteer firefighters might not be fired, they certainly can be reprimanded and, in some cases, dismissed if their departments deem it justified. Even if you don’t care about yourself or your department, at least have consideration for your fellow firefighters and for our great fire service by sharing appropriate information in the appropriate manner. The professional firefighter must avoid racist, sexist, vulgar, and mean-spirited opinions and rants.

    Some think the answer is simply to ban any use of social media within their departments. I couldn’t disagree more; social media is here to stay. Embraced correctly, it can not only reinforce a department’s professional reputation, but it can also be used to convey important information during emergencies and used to keep citizens informed and up-to-date.

    Use social media to showcase your department’s activities. Have your social media team post photos of your firefighters training and operating at emergency scenes. Show off how involved and engaged the department is within the local community by highlighting various community events, standbys, and other details the department attends. Deliver fire safety messages and announce upcoming fire department events and use it to recruit new members. I also think it’s a great idea to share members own personal success stories such as a job promotion or school achievements with the junior members. Doing so promotes good morale and helps build house pride. 

    Social media is an incredibly powerful tool and can immediately impact a firefighter’s and fire department’s reputation. Embrace it and use it correctly to make a positive impact and help paint the picture of a professional volunteer fire department.  

    Thomas A. Merrill is a 30-year fire department veteran in the Snyder Fire Department, which is located in Amherst, New York. He served 26 years as a department officer, including 15 years in the chief officer ranks, and recently completed five years as chief of department. He also is a professional fire dispatcher for the town of Amherst fire alarm office. He can be reached at tamerrill63@aol.com.